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Abstract
This article examines the contemporary debate surrounding the system of credit 
delivery and availability in India in light of the changes brought about by the 
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The introduction of the Code is pur-
ported to resolve the issues within the credit ecosystem by identifying correctly 
all the stakeholders, most importantly the creditors and the debtors, resolving 
and settling non-performing assets, creating a robust mechanism for settling 
credit-related disputes, reducing creditor distrust and ensuring continuance of 
functioning of companies rather than being wound up for non-payment of debts. 
While the Code promises to be a game changer, there exist various challenges 
that need to be addressed as the success of the Code is dependent on the man-
ner in which its provisions are implemented, especially those pertaining to 
the strict timelines with parties seeking excessive discretionary indulgence 
from the adjudicatory authorities. Further, the challenges include impact of 
differential treatment meted out to the creditors, the committee of creditors 
being ordained with considerable powers over the fate of the corporate debtor, 
and the insolvency professionals being allowed to run the entities without 
much accountability and capability has resulted in an increased number of 
disputes. The legal, logical and procedural hurdles thus mentioned will need 
to be addressed in the most amicable manner within the foreseeable future.
 Keywords: insolvency, bankruptcy, sick companies, insolvency professionals, in-
formation utilities, committee of creditors, ﬁnancial creditors, operational creditors
Introduction 
India has often been chided for having fallen behind in terms of the 
development of its corporate economy by failing to keep up with global 
trends. In line with the vision of India's prime minister Narendra Modi, 
various initiatives have been undertaken so as to improve the interna-
tional image of India's corporate economy by introducing ground-break-
ing legislation that will go a long way in paving the path for economic 
growth and development in the country (Thakar and Thakar 2016).
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Since 2014 India has witnessed a marked improvement within the 
corporate sector in terms of legal, procedural and ritualistic practices. 
Over time these had become archaic, thereby hindering business devel-
opment and growth. With the election of the new government in 2014 
signiﬁcant positive changes have been carried out so as to improve the 
entire ﬁnancial and corporate ecosystem, including introduction of a 
goods and service tax, the Amended Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 
labour reform and, most importantly, the introduction of the Insolvency 
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. This is by far the most important single piece 
of legislation that was lacking from India's statute books, considering 
the very large number of non-performing assets (NPAs) that the Indian 
banking system is currently saddled with (Jain 2017).
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (hereinafter referred to as 'the 
Code') provides a consolidated mechanism for resolving corporate 
insolvency in India. It seeks to induce efﬁciency within the insolvency 
and bankruptcy law regime by separating the commercial and judicial 
aspects of the insolvency and bankruptcy process. The Code stands on 
four pillars: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI, the regula-
tor), the National Company Law Tribunal and the National Company 
Law Appellate Tribunal (the uniﬁed adjudicatory authority), insolvency 
professionals and information utilities. The Code has revamped the 
earlier mechanism of debt resolution to be more efﬁcient and effective. 
It has greatly strengthened the legal infrastructure pertaining to the liq-
uidation, rehabilitation and revival of failing commercial entities, which 
promises to improve India's ranking on the Ease of Doing Business In-
dex. In a signiﬁcant move, the Code marks a departure from the earlier 
approach of 'debtor in possession' to 'creditor in possession'. The Code 
will play a vital role in strengthening the country's credit ecosystem. 
This article critically analyses the provisions of the Code in detail, 
delving into the history of insolvency and bankruptcy rules prior to the 
coming of the Code in the ﬁrst section. The second section details the basic 
features of the Code. The third section covers the challenges that the Code 
has brought to the fore, while the fourth discusses the success of the Code. 
The article ends with a conclusion and a summary of arguments.
History of Insolvency Laws in India
India has had the dubious distinction of having chequered laws for 
solving insolvency and bankruptcy cases. For many years the Pro-
vincial Insolvency Act of 1920 and Presidency Insolvency Act of 1909 
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addressed bankruptcy and insolvency issues. Subsequently these laws 
were replaced by an array of statutes. Provisions relating to insolvency 
and bankruptcy for companies and ﬁnancial ﬁrms were found in the 
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA), the 
Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 
(RDDBFI), the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and 
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the Companies Act, 2013.1 
Individual bankruptcy and insolvency was dealt with by the Presidency 
Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, 
and was therefore the responsibility of the Courts. The Reserve Bank 
of India has from time to time introduced various schemes, rules and 
regulations in order to reduce the instances of loan default, and conse-
quently the instances of NPAs, with the intention of realizing as much 
of the loan amount as possible. These measures included the Corporate 
Debt Restructuring Scheme, a Joint Lenders Forum with strategic debt 
restructuring, and the sustainable structuring of stressed assets (Pahwa 
2010). SICA was the single most important statute pertaining to the 
insolvency and bankruptcy of companies; the others were merely its 
offshoots/extensions. Thus, SICA and the RDDBFI are discussed in 
some detail below. 
The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985
SICA was the result of a high-powered expert committee constituted 
by the Reserve Bank of India under the chairmanship of Mr T. Tiwari. 
It suggested that a robust mechanism was required to revive and reha-
bilitate sick industrial companies. Its jurisdiction included industrial 
companies that were listed in Schedule I to the Industries (Development 
and Regulation) Act, 1951 and government companies (Narayanan 
1994a: 362). The onus of reporting sickness to the Board for Industrial 
and Financial Reconstruction (the Board, BIFR) lay with the board of 
directors of the potentially sick company, the Reserve Bank of India, 
central government and/or ﬁnancial institutions that had an interest 
in the company. The law provided that reference was required to be 
made within a period of two months from the date of discovery of sick-
ness, and the Board was mandated to deliver a verdict and ensure that 
a scheme of rehabilitation was implemented within 90 days of the date 
of the order (Pahwa 2010). The law also placed a moratorium on all 
transactions, whether ﬁnancial, commercial or legal, until the scheme 
was approved by the Board. The statute was well drafted, but a lot of 
discretionary powers were extended to the Board. This eventually led 
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to unrealistic and unreasonable time extensions, which in effect marred 
the chance of a company recovering. The law only catered for a speciﬁc 
set of companies, which reduced the applicability and in effect the ef-
ﬁcacy of the statute. 
Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 
1993
This was introduced because the banking sector felt that a specialized 
law was required pertaining to and addressing the dire need for the 
realization of debts due to banks and ﬁnancial institutions. It is pertinent 
to note that the banking system forms the backbone of the corporate 
economy and cannot be expected to function without adequate checks, 
balances and the consequent realization of debts (Dubey 2013). The basic 
purpose and object of this Act was the expeditious recovery of debts 
due to banks. It substituted for the process of the courts in relation to 
recovery suits for bank dues, as provided for within the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1905. Proceedings under the Act were calculated to counter 
the dilatory tactics adopted by the recalcitrant litigants (Chandrasekhar 
2018). The Act was a complete code in itself, as far as the recovery of 
debt by ﬁnancial institutions was concerned.
While analysing the reasons for requirement of the new law, it was 
observed that even though the object behind SICA and RDDBFI was 
the revival of sick companies and the settling of debts due to banks and 
ﬁnancial institutions, not too many revivals took place, and in the process 
a protective wall was created such that creditors failed to realize their 
debts from the debtors (Srivastava and Yadav 1986). This led the NPAs 
to become even more unserviceable, which eventually drove down the 
banks' balance sheets. It was thus considered that laws permitting the 
squandering of wealth rather than consolidation and revival should 
best be removed from the statute books, rather than being allowed to 
become a burden on the entire economy.
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
As has been indicated, the Code is aimed at bringing about a paradigm 
shift within India's insolvency and bankruptcy laws. Therefore, a dis-
cussion of the constitutionality, objectives and features of the statute is 
required, in order to assess the success of the law. 
_________________________________________________________________________79
________________________________________ Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
Constitutional Law Provisions
The Indian Constitution, which is the suprema lex for the country, enu-
merates the manner in which insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings 
shall be undertaken. The insolvency and bankruptcy aspect of corporate 
law has been listed in the Concurrent List, entry 9, given under Schedule 
VII, article 246 of the Constitution, which gives both central govern-
ment and the states the power to make laws and rules on the subject 
(Jain 2014). Since India is a federation, there exists a division of powers 
between central and state governments. The Concurrent List includes 
all those subjects on which both central government and the states can 
make laws. However, if any state law is found to be in opposition to 
a law made by central government, the Supreme Court can strike the 
relevant provision from the statute book.
The constitutional validity of the Code was discussed at length by the 
Supreme Court of India in the celebrated case of Innoventive Industries 
Limited,2 where it was observed that the Code, being the central law, pre-
vailed over all existing laws pertaining to insolvency and bankruptcy. 
Objectives of the Code
The objectives of the Code are manifold, but its primary purpose was to 
plug the loopholes that existed in earlier legislation, as discussed in the 
previous section. Further, it enabled the creation of a new institutional 
framework consisting of an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board, profession-
al insolvency agencies, information utilities and adjudicating authorities, 
thus offering uniform and comprehensive legislation for the facilitation 
of time-bound insolvency resolution and liquidation. Finally the Code 
aimed to improve the ease of doing business in India and to set up better 
and faster debt recovery mechanisms (Wadhwa 2016: 23–29). Thus, the 
Preamble of the Code clearly lays down its primary objectives: 
1. 'to merge and modify the laws relating to reorganization and in-
solvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership ﬁrms and 
individuals in a time bound manner'.
2. 'maximization of value of assets of such persons, to promote entre-
preneurship, availability of credit and balance the interests of all 
the stakeholders'.
3. to set up an insolvency and bankruptcy board of India. 
Narayanan (1994b: 250) observes that the major problems for the ex-
isting mechanism for solving insolvency and bankruptcy issues were a 
multiplicity of laws, overlapping jurisdictions and limited links between 
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the existing statutes. These obstacles ultimately resulted in delays to 
the resolution process for insolvencies, leading to frustration among 
all stakeholders, especially creditors who were deprived of their right 
to credit realization. With all the relevant laws coming together under 
one roof, with a single authority for adjudication and regulation, there is 
hope that bankruptcy proceedings will be resolved in a timely manner. It 
is for this reason that the Code has been made applicable to companies, 
limited liability partnerships, ﬁrms and individuals.
It is important to have a robust mechanism for resolving insolvency 
issues and opting for an appropriate mechanism that promises revival 
and rehabilitation/liquidation of companies in the shortest possible 
time. A delay often results in loss to the economy in terms of resources, 
production, employment and development of the industry concerned, 
leading to poor growth and development (Ayotte and Skeel 2010). It 
also leads to a trust deﬁcit among the creditors, who in order to ring 
fence themselves lend selectively and become wary of investing in 
entrepreneurial initiatives or small-scale industries. In the past credi-
tors received few rights and little legal protection when it came to the 
recovery of dues in the event of a default, as the erring promoters and 
management would more often than not remain in full control of com-
pany assets (Jongho Kim 2009: 119).
That creditors have often been handed a raw deal is indicated by the 
fact that they were willing to take huge haircuts even after the intro-
duction of the Code, as was indicated in the case of Synergies Dooray 
Automated Ltd vs Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited and Ors.3 
Under the Code, the creditors took a 94 per cent haircut; that is, they 
realized INR 54 crores. 
Synergies Dooray applied to the tribunal under Section 10 for ini-
tiating a resolution process, pursuant to which an interim resolution 
professional was appointed and a public notice issued. The total debt 
of the company amounted to INR 972.15 crores. Of the four resolution 
plans that were received, the plan by Synergies Casting Ltd received 
90.16 per cent of the vote, and it was decided that debt would be sold 
for INR 5408.21 lakhs (amounting to about 54 crores). 
This case is indicative of the fact that creditors have generally had 
to struggle to realize their dues and were therefore wary of the entire 
settlement process under the Code as well. Going by their previous 
experiences, they decided to accept the haircut in the hope of at least 
realizing some of their claims.
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As per the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee report,4 lenders are 
able to realize only 20 per cent of their dues. This clearly indicates the 
sad state of affairs that prevails. Credit is the lifeblood of the economy, 
and for successful corporate growth a constant supply of credit is es-
sential. A ﬁrm that is freely entering the competitive corporate sector 
may fail to deliver as planned for various reasons. These may or not be 
economic; they can be social, policy driven or in some cases the result 
of bad faith. In any scenario the inability of one debtor to realize debts 
should not dampen the spirit of lending. The Indian economy has 
suffered in a number of ways owing to the absence of an appropriate 
mechanism for addressing default. One of the major setbacks suffered 
by the economy is a poorly developed credit market, as lenders are 
unwilling to lend because they fear a loss of investment and therefore 
lower funds at their disposal, which in turn will limit their ability to 
lend again (Tomasic 2006). Further, low and delayed recovery raises 
the cost of credit, which leads to expensive projects that are ultimately 
not unviable. The lack of adequate credit availability in a cash-strapped 
economy has further resulted in the stiﬂing of corporate growth. Many 
labour-intensive industries have also taken a beating, as they have been 
starved of credit facilities.
The Code thus addresses business failures either by rescuing failed 
businesses or by releasing resources from failed businesses back into 
the economy, thereby promoting corporate growth and providing a 
seeding ground for entrepreneurship.5 Through provisions for resolu-
tion and liquidation, the Code enables lenders to recover funds from 
future earnings, after resolution or after the sale of liquidation assets. 
They can now distinguish price and credit risks across risk categories 
and offer differentiated and customized credit products across the 
value chain (Sahoo 2018). Further, the inevitable consequence of a 
resolution process deters management and promoters of the corporate 
debtor from committing a default, thereby minimizing the incidence 
of this. The supply of credit is thereby increased, reducing the cost of 
funds and developing a debt market. The Code thus addresses default 
and enhances the availability of credit for business.6 There has been 
a marked improvement in credit realization, with a sudden spurt of 
debt clearances by corporate debtors: 2,100 companies settled INR 
83,000 crores' worth of dues immediately after the implementation of 
the Code.7 Therefore the Code seems to be a welcome step, as it aims at 
the settling of dues in a timely manner with the intention of balancing 
the interests of all stakeholders. 
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It also needs to be pointed out that the Code facilitates the better util-
ization of resources while preserving the value of an enterprise (Sharma 
2017). It enables the optimum utilization of resources by preventing the 
use of resources below the optimum level, ensuring efﬁcient resource 
use within the ﬁrm through the resolution of insolvency and by releas-
ing unutilized or underutilized resources so they can be used efﬁciently 
through closure of the ﬁrm. The Code thus addresses the inefﬁciency 
of resource utilization and thereby maximizes the value of assets. It is 
believed that if resources that are currently unutilized or underutilized 
for whatever reason can be put to more efﬁcient use the growth rate 
may well go up by a few percentage points, other things being equal, 
particularly when this is accompanied by the availability of credit and 
entrepreneurship, as observed by Jongho Kim (2009: 119).
Features of the Code: Four Pillars
The Code rests on four pillars: the regulator (the Insolvency and Bank-
ruptcy Board of India), the adjudicatory body (national company law 
and the appellate tribunal), insolvency professionals and information 
utilities. These will now be brieﬂy discussed.
1. Regulator
Under Section 188, the Code envisages the setting up of an Insolvency 
and Bankruptcy Board of India. The Board will regulate all matters 
related to insolvency and bankruptcy, set out eligibility requirements 
for insolvency intermediaries (insolvency professionals, professional 
insolvency agencies and information utilities), regulate entry, registra-
tion and exit of insolvency intermediaries, make model by-laws for 
professional insolvency agencies, set out regulatory standards for insol-
vency professionals, specify the manners in which information utilities 
can collect and store data, and oversee the functioning of insolvency 
intermediaries and the resolution process.
2. Adjudicatory Authority
Under Section 60 of the Code, it is envisaged that corporate persons shall 
be adjudicated upon by the National Company Law Tribunal and the 
Appellate Authority, based on the territorial jurisdiction within which 
the corporate person in question is located. 
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3. Information Utilities
Information utilities are repositories of ﬁnancial information established 
under the Code in order to remove information asymmetry from the 
insolvency processes. They help the Code to attain uniformity in trans-
actions and transparency, ensuring that information asymmetry does 
not prejudicially affect the rights of the stakeholders. Chapter V of the 
Code details the broad framework for the formation, governance and 
core activities of information utilities. The process envisaged for the 
working of information utilities is summarized in Figure 1.
 
FIGURE 1. Working of the information utilities
The core activities as envisaged by the Code include collection, colla-
tion, authentication and dissemination of ﬁnancial information of debt-
ors in a universally accessible format, to allow creditors to access such 
information and ensure there is no lopsided supplying of information 
that gives undue advantage to any of the stakeholders. Access to this 
information is given to the resolution professionals, creditors and other 
stakeholders in the insolvency resolution process, so that all stakehold-
ers can make decisions based on the same information (Sahoo 2018). It 
is pertinent to note that to date only one information utility has been 
created, the National e-Governance Service. This organization, headed 
by Mr S. Raman, has already signed and executed about 85 contracts 
and has brought on board a signiﬁcant amount of ﬁnancial information. 
This is likely to pave the way for the successful automation of creditor 
agreements as well as bringing about signiﬁcant transparency within 
India's credit ecosystem. A brief summary of the transactions is given 
in Table 1.
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TABLE 1. Success of the information utilities
4. Insolvency Professionals
The insolvency professional takes care of the administrative functions of 
the corporate debtor once the adjudicatory authority admits the applica-
tion for the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP);8 that is, it 
manages the affairs of the company after the promoters and the manage-
ment handover control to the committee of creditors (Eshawar 2016). The 
Code gives considerable powers to the insolvency professionals, and with 
their growing numbers it is likely that a specialized cadre of ofﬁcers spe-
cializing in resolution process will be created to help better implementa-
tion of the Code. Their numbers are brieﬂy given in Table 2.
TABLE 2. Number of registered information professionals
 
Insolvency professionals also have the responsibility of collecting 
information relating to assets, ﬁnances and operations, determining the 
ﬁnancial position of the corporate debtor, collection and consolidation 
of claims from creditors and most importantly the constitution of the 
committee of creditors (Vivek 2018). They must adhere to the strict code 
of conduct as laid down by the Code and take reasoned and judicious 
decisions, comply with all the requirements and terms and conditions 
speciﬁed in the by-laws of the insolvency professional agency and 
submit to the authority of the agency of which he is a member. The 
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insolvency professional is in charge of conducting the entire resolution 
process, including taking custody and control of all assets, representing 
and acting on behalf of the corporate debtor (Jain 2017: 38), convening 
and attending meetings of the committee of creditors, preparing infor-
mation memorandum and inviting resolution applicants to put forward 
resolution plans.
Other Features
1. Going from debtor in possession to creditor in possession
The Code has made a signiﬁcant departure from the erstwhile 
concept of debtor in possession to creditor in possession. The Code 
allows creditors to assess the viability of the corporate debtor while 
keeping a check on the proﬁtable assets and ensuring that the best 
practical decision is taken, in order to keep all the stakeholders 
satisﬁed while at the same time ensuring that the corporate debtor 
continues as a going concern. The Code therefore marks a shift 
from a debtor centric liquidation process to a creditor-determined 
resolution process. The idea of giving the debtor innumerable 
chances to survive, with the fond hope that it will revive and rise 
as a phoenix from the ashes is done away with (Salim 2007). In the 
present regime, businesses that do not perform well will perish 
faster, making resources available for other entrepreneurs, rather 
than merely prolonging an inevitable death. It should be noted that 
the Code marks a substantial change in legislative policy relating 
to corporate insolvency, wherein creditors in general and ﬁnancial 
creditors in particular are substantially empowered to obtain the 
debts that are due to them (Sriram 2016). The fate of the Code rests in 
the change in mindset of the creditors and the work that insolvency 
professionals render (Pandian 2016: 62–66).
2. Information memorandum and resolution plan
The resolution professional is required to prepare an informa-
tion memorandum that consists of the information required by a 
resolution applicant to make the resolution plan; it should include 
relevant ﬁnancial information (Anirudh 2018). The resolution pro-
fessional must invite prospective resolution applicants who fulﬁl 
the criteria laid down by him, with the approval of the committee 
of creditors, who will then use the information memorandum to 
prepare a resolution plan. The invited resolution applicant shall 
not be eligible to submit a resolution plan if he is an undischarged 
insolvent, is a wilful defaulter, has an account classiﬁed as NPA, 
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has been convicted with imprisonment for more than two years, is 
disqualiﬁed from acting as a director or does not comply with all 
other such provisions of Section 29A of the Code. Further, the reso-
lution professional must examine each submitted plan and verify 
whether it meets all the prerequisites speciﬁed in the Act.
3. Stringent timelines
The Code prescribes very strict timelines that are required to be 
adhered to for the successful culmination of proceedings that are 
ﬁled under the Code. The adjudicating authority is mandated to 
hear and decide whether to admit, reject or point out defects in the 
application that requests a resolution of debt either by the ﬁnancial 
creditor, the operational creditor or a corporate applicant a maxi-
mum of 14 days from the date of ﬁling.9 Once the adjudicatory au-
thority admits the plea for resolution, the entire resolution process 
must be completed within 180 days,10 with a maximum extension 
of 90 days.11 The committee of creditors is mandated to ﬁt all proce-
dural requirements within this strict schedule. The Code provides 
punitive measures in the form of the compulsory liquidation of the 
commercial entity if the deadlines are violated.12 These deadlines 
are one of the most important features of the Code, as they ensure 
that the timely resolution of debt is achieved. The Code shies away 
from giving any discretionary powers to the adjudicatory authority, 
as were given under the SICA to the Board for Industrial Finance 
and Reconstruction.
4. Special classes of creditors
The Code has made signiﬁcant efforts to streamline the various am-
biguities that often resulted in faulty interpretations, prolonged legal 
battles and undue delays in the settling of commercial entities' debts 
(Wood 2010). The Code has identiﬁed different types of creditors 
and gives them differential rights. Apart from the regular creditors, 
in the form of decree holders and bond holders, the Code draws a 
distinction between ﬁnancial creditors, operational creditors and 
other creditors. Financial creditors are identiﬁed as those who have 
lent out any ﬁnancial debt as deﬁned under the Code.13 The Code 
further identiﬁes operational creditors as a separate category. Under 
the previous law the rights of employees were often in jeopardy 
whenever a company went into liquidation.14 With the deﬁnition 
of operational creditor including within its ambit employees of the 
company, there is a certainty with respect to the claiming of dues 
from the company.
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Deﬁning Features of the Code
It is safe to say that the Code has evolved signiﬁcantly in terms of its 
introduction of new concepts and improving earlier principles. The Code 
has introduced the committee of creditors,15 as discussed earlier, which 
takes the decision either to liquidate the corporate debtor or to resurrect 
it as a going concern. The committee of creditors solely comprises the 
ﬁnancial creditors. Secondly, the Code has imposed a moratorium over 
all the contracts and obligations of the corporate debtor for the entire 
duration that the insolvency proceedings are in force.16 This ensures 
that the corporate debtor does not surreptitiously alienate any of the 
properties to the detriment of the corporate debtors. Lastly, it is worth-
while noting that the Code has made signiﬁcant efforts to incorporate 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade and Law (UN-
CITRAL) principles that govern insolvency laws within the Code.17 The 
principles provide rules for ensuring certainty in the market to promote 
efﬁciency and growth, allow maximization of the value of assets, strike 
a balance between liquidation and reorganization, ensure equitable 
treatment of similarly situated creditors and establish provisions for 
the timely, efﬁcient and impartial resolution of insolvency. They also 
make provisions for the preservation of the insolvent estate, in order to 
allow equitable distribution to creditors, while at the same time ensuring 
a transparent and predictable insolvency law that contains incentives 
for gathering and dispensing information (Ravi 2015). The principles 
make provisions for the recognition of existing creditor rights and the 
establishment of clear rules in order to rank the priority of claims. They 
also emphasize the establishment of a framework for cross-border in-
solvency. It is worthwhile to note that almost all these provisions have 
been incorporated in some manner within the Code. 
Process of CIRP as Envisioned within the Code 
Part II of the Code deals with matters relating to the insolvency and 
liquidation of companies and limited liability partnership ﬁrms where 
the minimum amount of the default is rupees one lakh; this amount 
can be increased to rupees one crore by central government.18 The ap-
plication may be ﬁled either by the ﬁnancial or operational creditor 
or the corporate applicant himself. The adjudicating authority either 
accepts or rejects the application within a period of 14 days. Once the 
application has been accepted an automatic moratorium is imposed on 
all contractual and legal proceedings pertaining to the corporate debtor. 
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Simultaneously an insolvency professional is appointed and a public 
announcement to the effect is made. The insolvency professional then 
convenes a meeting of the committee of creditors, constituting only 
ﬁnancial creditors, and works on a resolution plan to be submitted to 
the adjudicatory authority within a period of 180 days. If the committee 
of creditors is unable to reach a viable solution, the corporate debtor 
moves towards liquidation, in which case the insolvency professional 
will become the ofﬁcial liquidator. The process of insolvency as envi-
sioned in the Code is summarized in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. CIRP followed under the Code
 
 
Application by
Financial /Operational Creditor 
Corporate Debtor
National Company Law Tribunal 
(NCLT) to either accept or reject 
Appointment of Insolvency Resolution 
Professional (14 days)
Constitution of Committee of 
Creditors 
Resolution Professional to invite, accept 
and verify bids for the company
Committee of Creditors to either 
accept or reject the offer
Corporate Debtor either 
continues as a going 
concern or goes into 
mandatory liquidation
Challenges 
The Code is in its nascent stage and is naturally besieged with various 
teething problems. However, it is pertinent to note that there seem to 
exist certain fundamental problems and ambiguities within the framing 
of the law itself. It has been pointed out that no law is perfect from its 
inception and always comes with some grey areas. With appropriate 
delegated legislation and judicial interpretation, these problems can be 
ironed out.
1. Stringent Timelines
The stringent timelines under the Code are a welcome step as they 
bring certainty, limit the scope for any dilatory tactics and also ensure 
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the maintenance of asset values allowing the creditors' debts to be paid. 
However, these strict timelines are considered a bane rather than a 
boon by various commentators. The law is clear that the entire process, 
including listing of claims, settling disputes with operational creditors, 
inviting bids, deliberating on them, accepting a ﬁnal bid from prospec-
tive buyers for the company and ﬁnal reorganization, resolution and 
liquidation must end within 180 days, which is extendable by 90 days. 
This seems to be unfair as many companies do not have adequate time 
to fully analyse the relevant ﬁnancial information and respond within 
the stipulated time period with an adequate representation (Umarji 
2016). The stringent timelines leave no scope for the committee of credi-
tors and the insolvency professional to be thorough in their approach 
or to receive maximum offers for rehabilitation; this greatly reduces 
competition among bidders. 
One case in point is that of Bhushan Steel, one of the 40 cases that were 
referred to the adjudicating authority by the Reserve Bank of India, hav-
ing a debt of INR 45,000 crores. In this case the insolvency professional 
was approached by two bidders, Tata Steel and JSW Steel, who submit-
ted their bids on the last appointed day. However, soon after this date 
a resolution proposal was received from Liberty House, a British steel 
giant. The insolvency professional refused to accept the bid since it was 
submitted after the due date. However, the company approached the 
adjudicating authority and invoked its discretionary jurisdiction, citing 
the non-availability of complete information on Bhushan Steel in the 
limited timeframe. This meant that they were unable to submit a proper 
proposal in a timely manner. For this reason, they sought permission to 
submit their bid to the auction. The adjudicatory authority, making use 
of its discretionary powers, allowed the bid to be submitted, and directed 
the committee of creditors to evaluate it. While the strict deadlines help 
creditors ensure the timely resolution of debts, it is likely to affect the 
bids the companies receive with regard to rehabilitation, and eventually 
this will affect the competition within the market. It is currently (2018) 
only the large conglomerates who have managed to submit proposals 
within the stipulated time. Approximately 30 per cent of the companies 
have missed their conclusion deadlines and another 20 per cent are on 
the extended deadline. The fact is vindicated by the ﬁgures available 
on the subject that are given in Table 3.
Further, it needs to be pointed out that the strict timelines are also 
laying the foundation for excessive use of the adjudicatory authority's 
discretionary powers, as has been recently witnessed in Quantum Limited 
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TABLE 3. Timeline followed within the CIRP
 
 
vs Indus Finance Corporation. In this case the extension application was 
ﬁled after the expiry of the 180-day period, that is on the 181st day, citing 
non-consensus by the committee of creditors on a resolution proposal. 
The appellate tribunal allowed the application on a narrow interpreta-
tion of the Code, stating that it does not stipulate that the application for 
extension be made within the 180 days. Similarly, in another case where 
the creditor stalled the resolution process without citing any reason, 
the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) directed the 
committee of creditors to re-evaluate the proposal for rehabilitation, 
even though the mandatory 270 days had elapsed. This was one of the 
ﬁrst cases to be ﬁled under the Code, and the dilatory tactics led not 
only to huge losses but also to the shutting down of a going concern. 
This decision of the appellate authority was based on the reasoning 
of the wider public good.19
2. Differential Treatment Meted out to Different Classes of 
Creditors
An analysis of the Code demonstrates that differential treatment is 
meted out to different classes of creditors. As discussed above, while 
ﬁnancial, operational, secured and unsecured creditors are separately 
deﬁned, the committee of creditors is constituted only of ﬁnancial credi-
tors, keeping out all the others.20 The committee of creditors decides the 
path the corporate debtor eventually takes, be it liquidation or resolu-
tion; other creditors have no say in this. Similarly, when it comes to the 
settlement of dues as enumerated in Section 53 of the statute, the terms 
secured and unsecured creditors are used without naming ﬁnancial or 
operational creditors. This differential treatment within the statute is 
likely to reduce its efﬁcacy (Ramamurthy 2016).
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This differential treatment has raised a huge problem amongst the 
various operational creditors, who believe that it is because of their ef-
forts that the companies operate; by omitting them from the key deci-
sion-making process, their rights are prejudicially affected. This issue 
was raised by the operational creditors of Binani Cement,21 which was 
undergoing insolvency proceedings, wherein it was argued that the 
operational creditors should be allowed as much say in money matters 
as anybody else. They proved their point by stopping all supplies of 
materials to Binani Plant. Ultimately the Supreme Court relented and 
directed the insolvency professional to record their claims and allow 
them a seat at the table. This was an instance of the excessive use of dis-
cretionary power by the adjudicating authority. The IBBI has amended 
the law that compels the committee of creditors to submit a written 
report, clarifying the manner in which the rights of all the creditors are 
settled. Further, a subsequent amendment in October 2018 has mandated 
the committee of creditors to settle the dues of the operational creditors 
before those of the ﬁnancial creditors. These changes appear to be posi-
tive, yet closer scrutiny reveals that they are just knee-jerk reactions to 
the various contests taking place before the adjudicating authority. As 
a responsible regulator, the IBBI needs to stop making changes within 
the law on a regular basis just because of some challenge or other. It 
is likely that if this trend continues, the original Code will be changed 
beyond recognition, with negative effects for the economy. 
There have been other instances where either the creditor was not 
given his due on account of the misinterpretation of deﬁnitions in the 
Code or the non-existence of rights within it. One case is that of Nikhil 
Mehta and Sons vs M/s AMR Infrastructure Ltd,22 in which home buyers 
were given the status of ﬁnancial creditors. Subsequently, an amend-
ment was brought about by the IBBI recognizing them as such. It is 
pertinent to point out, though, that even though the amendment refers 
to home buyers as ﬁnancial creditors, no commensurate rights have 
been handed over under Section 53 of the Code, which shies away from 
deﬁning creditors as identiﬁed earlier. 
Various other cases have been found to falter when they interpreted 
the term 'creditor', for example Jaypee Infratech Limited,23 and Col. Vinod 
Awasthy vs AMR Infrastructures Ltd.24
3. Too Much Power in the Hands of the Committee of Creditors
It is imperative to note that the committee of creditors has been given 
signiﬁcant power to decide the fate of the corporate debtor, whether it 
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will be a going concern or whether it will be liquidated. In the absence 
of any speciﬁc guidelines with respect to the manner in which decision-
making will take place, it is likely that the committee of creditors will 
assume considerable powers over the corporate debtor, which may not 
be in the public interest (Chaudhary and Kapoor 2016). In certain recent 
cases the prudence behind committee of creditors' decisions has been 
questioned. In the case of Rave Scans, the committee of creditors decided 
against a proposal without citing any speciﬁc reason, even though the 
creditors were getting INR 51 crores in response to a debt of INR 36 
crores. Situations like this need to be curbed in order to ensure that the 
efﬁcacy of the statute is not undermined.
4. Liability of the Insolvency Professional
As discussed above, the insolvency professional has the responsibility 
of running the company after insolvency proceedings have been initi-
ated and a moratorium on all the contracts and legal proceedings has 
been imposed. The Code is silent with respect to the qualiﬁcations of 
the insolvency professional and the required capabilities of the person 
appointed to run the entire business as a caretaker. While the profes-
sional only takes care of the administrative functions, one cannot be 
oblivious to the possibility that irreparable damage will be caused to 
the corporate debtor. 
A case in point is that of Mr Mukesh Mohan, who allegedly manipu-
lated the committee of creditors, presented only a few of the resolution 
proposals and in some matters circumvented the committee of credi-
tors altogether in order to take decisions with regard to the resolution 
process. This proved to be detrimental to the corporate debtor and the 
entire resolution process. Similarly, in the case of MsRuia, the insolvency 
professional decided to change the entire management of the company 
including the chief executive ofﬁcer, for a period of one month, and 
charged a fee of INR 14 crores when the corporate debtor's total debt 
was only 4,16 crores. 
In both these cases, IBBI held the persons involved liable for miscon-
duct and violation of the basic principles of the Code. However, nothing 
fruitful is likely to emerge from this, since the duties of the insolvency 
professional only mention good faith when it comes to avoiding liability 
for erroneous decisions. It is imperative that rules and regulations be 
drafted to identify the exact job description of the insolvency profes-
sional. 
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5. Silence on Third-party Contracts
The Code is surprisingly silent on the impact of potential third-party 
contracts between the committee of creditors and any outside party that 
could not bid at the auction either voluntarily or because it missed the 
deadline. There is no clause in the law that forbids the committee of 
creditors from accepting a proﬁtable offer that promises higher returns 
to the creditors and ensures the company continues as a going concern 
(Singh 2017). The Code does not bar the creditors either collectively or 
individually from contracting with such a third party. This situation 
arose in the recent case of Monnet Ispat, wherein the proposers failed 
to make the due proposals in time and subsequently approached the 
corporate debtor for an out of court settlement. The matter is subjudice 
at the time of writing and details are not available. While the Code im-
poses a moratorium on the existing agreements and contracts that are 
operative between the stakeholders and the corporate debtor, there is 
no such bar on creditors with third-party interests.
6. Variance in Behaviour of Stakeholders at Odds with the 
Overall Objective
It is possible that each stakeholder will have his own interest, and these 
interests can often diverge from the stated overarching objectives of 
the resolution process. The stakeholders are expected to behave in a 
manner that maximizes value for themselves (Sullivan et al. 1987). 
Without explicitly recognizing the variations in interests and the likely 
behavioural patterns brought about, the stipulated standard resolution 
process may not be the most optimal. Hence the behaviour of the vari-
ous stakeholders needs to be modelled in detail, and this should lead to 
appropriate allowances and improvisations in the design of a resolution 
framework (Hemant 2017).
Success of the Code
It is pertinent to note that even with all the challenges discussed above, 
the success rate of the Code cannot be undermined. It has managed to 
bring the insolvency laws into focus with a possible tilt towards the 
resolution of debts and the reorganization of companies that are resur-
rected rather than shut down. Over the two years from October 2016 
as many as 1,200 companies have approached the process under the 
Code and gone into liquidation, of which approximately 400 cases have 
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been concluded and the rest are in different stages of CIRP, as shown 
in Table 4.
TABLE 4. Number of CIRPs by sector
Sector Closed Running Total
Manufacturing 172 350 522
Food, beverages  
and tobacco products 
14 47 61
Chemicals and chemical products 14 40 54
Electrical machinery and apparatus 15 40 55
Fabricated metal products except 
machinery 
12 25 37
Machinery and equipment 32 38 70
Textiles, leather  
and apparel products 
30 52 82
Wood, rubber, plastic  
and paper products 
13 26 39
Basic metal 33 66 99
Other metal 9 16 25
Real estate, renting and business 
activities 
68 141 209
Construction 27 97 124
Wholesale and retail trade 52 71 123
Hotels and restaurants 12 21 33
Electricity and others 10 19 29
Transport, storage  
and communications 
10 19 29
Others 31 98 129
Total 382 816 1198
It is worthwhile noting that the running rate of insolvencies after 
its inception has been remarkable, considering the hiccups faced in 
terms of interpretation of various terms, ambiguities with respect to 
deadlines, rights of various stakeholders and insolvency professionals, 
and so on. It may be noted that despite these problems numerous (269) 
voluntary liquidation applications have been ﬁled, of which only six 
have been concluded. Further, the decision of the RBI to refer the biggest 
defaulters, amounting to 25 per cent of the present NPAs, has helped 
bring credence to the law as having the complete faith of the state and 
favouring all stakeholders equally. The list has been extracted in Table 
5 for ready reference.
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TABLE 5. Companies Preferred by the Reserve Bank of India for 
CIRP
List of 15 
Companies Referred by RBI
S.No Name of the  Company
Debt Value 
(in Crore) Status
1 Bhushan Steel 44,478 Tata Steel has acquired the ﬁrm 
2 Jyoti Structures 5,165
Resolution plan pending for approval 
with the National Company Law Tribunal 
(NCLT)
3 Essar Steel 37,284
Bids by Arcelor Mittal and Numetal 
disqualiﬁed. Disqualiﬁcation challenged 
before the NCLT
4 Era Infra  Engineering 10,065 Admitted for insolvency proceedings
5 Monnet Isapt and Energy 12,115
Resolution plan submitted by Aion JSW 
approved by NCLT
6 Alok Industries 22,075
Committee of creditors approves joint 
resolution plan submitted by RIL and JM 
Financial ARC
7 Electrosteel Steels 10,273 Vedanta has acquired the ﬁrm 
8 Amtek Auto 14,074
Liberty House declared as the highest  
bidder but challenged by resolution  
professional. Matter pending with the 
NCLT 
9 ABG Shipyard 6,953 NCLT has directed resolution professional to consider Liberty House bid
10 Lanco Infratech 44,364
Committee of creditors deciding on the 
resolution plan submitted by Thriveni 
Earthmovers
11 Jaypee Infratech 9,635
IBBI and resolution professional have  
appealed to the Supreme Court to revive 
the insolvency process. 
12 Bhushan Power and Steel 37,248
Tata Steel, Liberty House in race. Matter 
pending before the National Company 
Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT)
13 IVRCL 13,405.92 Matter referred to NCLT
14 Ruchi Soya  Industries Ltd 5,500 Matter referred to NCLT
15 Orchid Pharma Ltd 3200 Matter referred to NCLT
The success of any statute is discernible from the manner in which 
the obstacles that arise are taken care of. Various cases that have been 
discussed above should be read not only as challenges but also as 
success stories. For example, Essar Steel has managed to bring on board 
all the qualiﬁed bidders, while ensuring that there is no circumvention of 
the law in terms of Section 29A of the Code, which prohibits promoters 
and related parties from bidding for corporate debtors. 
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Conclusion
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code has made signiﬁcant efforts to 
revamp the entire credit ecosystem in India by amending and repealing 
the old foundations of the insolvency processes. The Code promises to 
bring about far-reaching reforms with an emphasis on creditor-driven 
insolvency resolution. It aims at the early identiﬁcation of ﬁnancial 
failure and thereby at maximizing the asset value of insolvent ﬁrms. 
A uniﬁed regime envisages a structured and time-bound process for 
insolvency resolution and liquidation, which should significantly 
improve debt recovery rates and revitalize the ailing Indian corporate 
bond market. 
The enactment and implementation of the Code will not only improve 
Indian world rankings in terms of the ease of doing business but will 
also improve the credit market, gross domestic product, foreign direct 
investment and the business environment as a whole. However, the 
success of the Code will be dependent on the manner in which its provi-
sions are implemented. There is ample proof that the law is on the right 
path, with the number of successful resolutions hitting double digits in 
less than two years. However, one should not become too complacent as 
challenges remain; these have been discussed above in some detail and 
pertain to legal, logical and procedural hurdles. The coming months will 
be crucial in ensuring that the challenges are addressed with the least 
possible tweaking of the existing legislation. However, the success story 
of the Code cannot be lost sight of merely because of a few challenges. 
The growth trajectory depicted by the Code is indicative of signiﬁcant 
improvements in the insolvency regime in India. 
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NOTES
1  Statement of objects and reasons, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
2  Innoventive Industries Limited vs. ICICI Bank and another. Decided by the Supreme 
Court on 31 August 2017.
3  Synergies Dooray's Insolvency Proceedings.
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4  Government of India, The Report of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee Volume I: 
Rationale and Design, 2015. http://ibbi.gov.in/BLRCReportVol1_04112015.pdf.
5  Message by M.S. Sahoo, Chairperson IBBI, in communication to Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy Journal, 2017.
6  Ibid.
7  'Owners settle Rs.83k-cr bank dues', Times of India, 23 May 2018, p. 17. https://times-
oﬁndia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/owners-settle-rs-83k-crore-bank-
dues/articleshow/64279946.cms.
8  Section 3(19) and 207 of the Code.
9  Section 7, 8, 9 respectively.
10  Section 12(1).
11  Section 12(3).
12  Section 33.
13  Deﬁned under section 5(8): (8) 'ﬁnancial debt' means a debt along with interest, if any, 
which is disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money and includes— 
( a ) m o n e y  b o r r o w e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  p a y m e n t  o f  i n t e r e s t ; 
( b ) a n y  a m o u n t  r a i s e d  b y  a c c e p t a n c e  u n d e r  a n y  a c c e p t -
a n c e  c r e d i t  f a c i l i t y  o r  i t s  d e - m a t e r i a l i z e d  e q u i v a l e n t ; 
(c) any amount raised pursuant to any note purchase facility or the is-
sue of bonds, notes, debentures, loan stock or any similar instrument; 
(d) the amount of any liability in respect of any lease or hire purchase con-
tract which is deemed as a ﬁnance or capital lease under the Indian Account-
ing Standards or such other accounting standards as may be prescribed; 
(e) receivables sold or discounted other than any receivables sold on nonrecourse basis; 
(f) any amount raised under any other transaction, including any forward 
sale or purchase agreement, having the commercial effect of a borrowing; 
(g) any derivative transaction entered into in connection with protection against or 
beneﬁt from ﬂuctuation in any rate or price and for calculating the value of any deriva-
tive transaction, only the market value of such transaction shall be taken into account; 
(h) any counter-indemnity obligation in respect of a guarantee, indemnity, bond, docu-
mentary letter of credit or any other instrument issued by a bank or ﬁnancial institution; 
(i) the amount of any liability in respect of any of the guarantee or indemnity for 
any of the items referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (h) of this clause.
14  Bank of Maharashtra vs Pandurang Keshav Gorwardkar & Ors, 2013 (6) SCALE 716.
15  Section 21.
16  Section 14.
17  Text of the UNCITRAL Guide to Insolvency. https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/eng-
lish/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf.
18  Section 4 of the Code.
19  M/s Rave Scans Private Limited.
20  Section 21 of the Code.
21  http://ibccases.com/nclt/bank-baroda-v-binani-cements-ca-20-2018-cp-359-
2017/.
22  Decided on 23 January 2017 by the Supreme Court of India. 
23  Decided on 16 May 2018 by National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata.
24  Decided on 20 February 2017 by National Company Law Tribunal, Principal Bench 
Delhi.
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